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NOTE
THE IDENTIFICATION OF INCOMPETENT
DEFENDANTS: SEPARATING THOSE UNFIT FOR
ADVERSARY COMBAT FROM THOSE WHO ARE
FIT
INTRODUCTION
We try a lot of things in law, but one thing we must not
do is try an insane person.'
Hadfield's attempted assassination of George the Third,
2
Berkowitz's shooting of young lovers,3 and other spectacular
crimes expose an ancient doctrine that appears to "save" even
confessed guilty persons from trial. Actually, the rule prohibit-
ing the trial of an incompetent criminal defendant merely post-
pones rather than avoids trial altogether.' Recently, concern for
I Bull, Fitness to Stand Trial, 8 CRIM. L. Q. 290 (1965-1966).
2 Even though the Crown had established its case in the attempted murder of the
King, the trial was discontinued once the defense made it known that ever since his
brain had been pierced by a sword in battle the defendant, James Hadfield, had
suffered from the delusion that he must sacrifice himself and others to keep the world
from coming to an end. See Hadfield's Case, 27 How. State Trials 1282 (1800).
2 For details surrounding the slayings by the "Son of Sam," see NEwSwEEK, Aug.
22, 1977, at 16; TIME, Aug. 22, 1977, at 22.
4 The rule is so frequently resorted to that there are more people in mental hospi-
tals for the criminally insane as a result of having been found unfit to stand trial than
people there as a result of having been found not guilty by reason of insanity. For
statistics on the frequency with which incompetency bars trial, see, e.g., Brakel,
Presumption, Bias, and Incompetency in the Criminal Process, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1105
n.3 (52% of all inmates in mental institutions were committed because incompetent
to stand trial compared to 4% who were committed due to a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity).
In interpreting these statistics it is important to remember the interdependency
of the doctrines for competency, to stand trial and criminal lon-responsibility: though
the tests are different, the incompetency-to-stand-trial doctrine often sorts out the
more seriously impaired who might have been found not guilty by reason of insanity
had they reached trial. Freiberg, "Out of Mind, Out of Sight": The Disposition of
Mentally Disordered Persons Involved in Criminal Proceedings, 3 MONASH U. L. REV.
134, 145 (1976)[hereinafter cited as Freiberg](15% of those charged with murder in
England from 1900 to 1949 were found incompetent to stand trial, compared to 21%
in Canada between 1961 and 1970. McGarry, Competency for Trial and Due Process
via the State Hospital, 122 AM. J. PSYCH. 623, 624 n.1 (1965)[hereinafter cited as
McGarry](.08% of those prosecuted in Massachusetts in 1961 were found incompetent
to stand trial); Rosenberg, Competency for Trial-Who Knows Best?, 6 CrmM. L. BuLL.
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the constitutional dimensions of the competency-to-stand-trial
requirement has grown. For instance, the failure to grant a
defendant a hearing on his competency, once substantial evi-
dence5 of incompetency is manifest, has been held a violation
of due process.6 Even after a hearing is held 7 and a determina-
tion of competency is made, if later developments throw doubt
on the decision, the trial judge has a duty to make further
inquiry." While the hearing need not be lengthy or involved, at
a minimum it must be of record, with both parties having an
opportunity to examine the witnesses.' Should the defendant
be found incompetent, he is usually confined, so that through
treatment the delay in bringing him to trial can be lessened;
but once it becomes obvious that he is not going to regain his
capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future, the defendant
must be released or civilly committed.'"
Despite this influx of cases on competency, including a
restatement of the test for competency to stand trial," the Su-
preme Court has left unanswered questions regarding the ap-
plication of the test for competency: What must a defendant
be able to do to "have sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understand-
ing"?' 2 How much must he understand to have "a rational as
well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against
him"?' 3 Which factors, in addition to the nature and extent of
his disability, are likely to affect the defendant's ability to
577, 578 (1970) (74% of the inmates at Matteawan State Hospital in New York in 1968
were committed because incompetent to stand trial); Note, Incompetency To Stand
Trial, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 454 n.2 (1967-1968) [hereinafter cited as Incompetency] (65%
of the inmates at Matteawan State Hospital in New York in 1962 were committed
because incompetent to stand trial).
Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1972).
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). Even as early as 1899, one court
stated, "It is not 'due process of law' to subject an insane person to trial upon an
indictment involving liberty or life." Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir.
1899).
7 It may be constitutionally permissible to defer a defendant's competency hear-
ing until the criminal proceeding is complete, as long as the inquiry is made with
dispatch. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 182 (1975).
Pouncey v. United States, 349 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920, 923 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
" Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
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satisfy the test? This Note focuses on these and other questions
that need to be answered if the competency test itself is to be
applied "with a reasonable degree of rational understanding."
I. THE HISTORY OF THE INCOMPETENCY DOCTRINE
A. The Rationale for the Doctrine
"The trial and conviction of a person mentally and physi-
cally incapable of making a defense violates certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of a free
government."14 The primary purpose of the incompetency rule
is to safeguard the accuracy of adjudication. The prohibition
against trying an incompetent is justified on the ground that
the defendant alone may know something that would prove his
innocence.
It would be inhumane, and to a certain extent a denial of
the right of trial upon the merits, to require one who has been
disabled by the act of God from intelligently making his de-
fense to plead or be tried for his life or liberty. There may be
circumstances in all cases of which the defendant alone has
knowledge, which would prove his innocence, the advantage
of which, if insane to such an extent that he did not appre-
ciate the value of such facts, or the propriety of communicat-
ing them to his counsel, he would be deprived.'5
4 Sanders v. Allen, 100 F.2d 717, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
,5 Jordan v. State, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (Tenn. 1911). In United States v. Chisolm,
149 F. 284, 287 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906) the court stated:
The reason why an insane person, or one who though not insane, is laboring
under such mental infirmity as to prevent his rationally aiding in his defense,
should not be put to trial, is, in the language of the old books, 'because he is
disabled by the act of God' from making a just defense if he has one, and
'because there may be circumstances lying in his private knowledge which
would prove him innocent of his legal irresponsibility, of which he can have
no advantage, because they are not known to persons who undertake his
defense.
Compare that with Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899), citing
among other common law authorities, 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34, 35, which
states:
If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before his
arraignment he becomes absolutely mad, he might not by law be arraigned
during such frenzy, but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be re-
moved. The reason is, because he cannot advisedly plead to the indictment
...*. for were he of sound memory, he might allege somewhat in stay of
judgment or execution.
The word "memory" as used by Hale had a meaning closer to "mind" than simply
the capacity to remember clearly. This reference suggests that initially the bar to trial
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If the defendant is not able to provide his counsel with the
information necessary for the construction of a defense, he can-
not meaningfully exercise rights designed to safeguard the ac-
curacy of the trial, such as his right to confer with counsel, his
right to testify, and his right to confront witnesses.' 6 However,
the unlikelihood that the defendant will be able to tell his
lawyer anything not available from other sources leads to a
suspicion that societal values other than accuracy are being
protected.
Another reason often given for the incompetency rule is
that it is unfair to have an adversary contest in which the
defendant, like a small boy being beaten by a bully, is unable
to dodge or return the blows.
[T]he humanity of the law of England falling into that
which common humanity, without any written law would
suggest, has prescribed, that no man shall be called upon to
make his defense at a time when his mind is in that situation
as not to appear capable of so doing for, however guilty he
may be, the inquiring into his guilt must be postponed to that
season, when by collecting together his intellects, and having
them entire, he shall be able so to model his defense as to
ward off the punishment of the law . . .,
A defendant can protect himself only if he is able to compare
his version of the events with the testimony given by others. He
may prejudice his cause if he insists on actions that are harmful
to his position which he would have avoided if he were in con-
tact with reality. For instance, he can alienate the jury if he
displays such inappropriate demeanor as grinning when grue-
some details are discussed, losing his temper when witnesses
was limited to capital offenses and even then only when the defendant was
"absolutely" mad.
" United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1906) where it is said:
[A] person, though not entirely sane, may be put upon trial in a criminal
case if he rightly comprehends his own condition with reference to the pro-
ceedings, and has such possession and control of his mental powers, includ-
ing the faculty of memory, as will enable him to testify intelligently and give
his counsel all the material facts bearing upon the criminal act charged
against him and material to repel the incriminating evidence, and has such
poise of his faculties as will enable him to rationally and properly exercise
all the rights which the law gives him in contesting a conviction.
,1 Frith's Case, 22 How. State Trials 307, 318 (1790).
1978]
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maintain he is a violent man, or acting indifferent to the pro-
ceedings.
A more subtle justification for the prohibition is that the
trying of an incompetent transmutes the adjudication from "a
reasoned interaction between an individual and his com-
munity" into "an invective against an insensible object."' 8 To
maintain the dignity necessary for the administration of jus-
tice, the defendant should be able to make basic decisions, in
response to well explained alternatives, regarding the conduct
of his trial, such as deciding how to plead or whether to take
the stand. Without a minimum amount of personal, intelligent
participation by the defendant, the result is less a feeling of
justice triumphant than of pathos. The incompetency doctrine
originated as an extension of the ban against trials in absen-
tia; 9 validation of the proceedings seems to require the mental
as well as the physical presence of the defendant in the court-
room.
20
A seldom mentioned but powerful psychological reason for
the requirement that the defendant be competent is that in
order to satisfy the urge of the community to punish,2' the
defendant must understand what he is being punished for.2 To
justify the action the state takes against him, the accused must
realize that in the eyes of the community his actions are mor-
ally reprehensible. To bring the force of the state to bear
against one of its members who does not understand why he is
being attacked has long been viewed as "a miserable spectacle,
both against law, and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and
can be no example to others. '23
The competency doctrine has been justified as a means of
'" Incompetency, supra note 4, at 458.
,1 See, e.g., Kinloch's Case, 18 How. State Trials 395, 411 (1746) where the court
said:
[T]he common sense and feeling of mankind, the voice of nature, reason
and revelation, all concur in this plain rule, that no man is to be condemned
unheard, and consequently no trial ought to proceed to the condemnation of
a man, who by the providence of God is rendered totally incapable of speak-
ing for himself, or of instructing another to speak for him.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-77 (1975).
1, Szasz, Some Observations on the Relationship Between Psychiatry and the
Law, 75 A.M.A. ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY & PSYCH. 297 (1956).
2 Incompetency, supra note 4, at 458-59.
23 3 COKE, INSTITUrS 6 (1644); see also Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
[Vol. 66
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insuring the integrity of the adversary method of criminal adju-
dication by promoting the accuracy, fairness and dignity of the
process. Moreover, the imposition of criminal sanctions to
achieve the traditional goals of deterrence and retribution is
less effective when the defendant is unable to comprehend the
reason for his punishment or possibly even the fact that he is
being punished.
B. The Test for Incompetency
The real question is: Does the mental impairment of the pris-
oner's mind, if such there be, whatever it is, disable him...
from fairly presenting his defense, whatever it may be, and
make it unjust to go on with his trial at this time, or is he
feigning to be in that condition. .... 
American courts early acknowledged the common law test
for competency.2s
The general rule at common law is that the test of a defen-
dant's present sanity during the trial and at the time of sent-
ence is not the right and wrong test, but the test is whether
one is capable of properly appreciating his peril and of ration-
ally assisting in his own defense. If he is not, then the defen-
dant is of such unsound mind that he may not be tried, sent-
enced, or punished.2 6
With only slight variations, the understand-and-assist test is
24 United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 298 (5th Cir. 1906).
21 United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1835)(No. 15,577)(as-
sault on President Jackson) where the court states:
But in case a man, in a frenzy, happen, by some oversight, or by means of
the gaoler, to plead to his indictment, and is put upon his trial; and it
appears to the court, upon his trial, that he is mad, the judge, in his discre-
tion, may discharge the jury of him, and remit him to gaol, to be tried after
the recovery of his understanding, especially if any doubt appear upon the
evidence touching the guilt of the fact [sic], and this is a favorem vitae. And
if there be no color of evidence to prove him guilty, or if there be pregnant
evidence to prove his insanity at the time of the fact [sic] committed, then,
upon the same favor of life and liberty, it is fit it should be proceeded in the
trial, in order to his acquittal and enlargement.
In United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906) the court said the
prisoner should be in "such possession of his mental faculties as enables him to rightly
comprehend his condition with reference to the proceedings against him and to ration-
ally aid in the conduct of his defense."
26 United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724, 725 (D. Ore. 1941).
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accepted today in almost every jurisdiction27 either by statute 8
or by case law.2"
The scope of the test has been greatly expanded during the
last decades as less obvious mental disabilities have been rec-
ognized as incapacitating," but the test itself remained rela-
tively unchanged until Dusky v. United States.3' The Supreme
Court, in this per curiam opinion, may have subtly altered the
test to incorporate twentieth-century ideas regarding behavior.
In Dusky the test is "whether he [the defendant] has suffi-
cient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasona-
ble degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings
against him. '3 2 By emphasizing the need for rationality, the
Dusky case expands the meaning of the charge that the defen-
dant must be able to understand the proceedings: not only
must the defendant be oriented to time, space, and things and
have some recollection of events, but he must also be able to
appraise and assess the proceedings.13 The Dusky test also
7 S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 408-23 (1971).
I ARZ. R. CRIM. P. 11.1; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West Cum. Supp. 1975-76);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-8-102(3) (1973); IDAHO CODE § 18-210 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-2-1 (1973); IND. CODE § 35-5-3.1-1 (1976); KAN. STAT. § 22-
3301 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 23 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020(1) (Vernon
Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-505(c)(3) (1969); NEV. REv. STAT. §
178.450(1) (1973); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 730.10 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.360 (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-38-1 (1967); TEx.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. tit. 46.02, § 1 (Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1966-1977); VA. CODE
§ 19.2-169 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-2(b) (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.21(6) (West
Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. § 7-242.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 4244
(1976); MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.04 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) where the test is "No
person who as a result of a mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the
proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures."
21 Compare FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a) merely stating the prohibition against the
trial of an incompetent, with Southworth v. State, 125 So. 345, 348-49 (Fla. 1929)
expressing the test for determining competency. See also Ky. R. CrmM. P. 8.06 and
Strickland v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1964).
10 T. SzASz, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 252 (1965).
31 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
32 Id.
3 The Dusky expansion of the test for incompetency is similar to the development
of the test for insanity at the time of the act. Whether following the M'Naghten or the
Model Penal Code versions of the test for non-responsibility, most jurisdictions today
interpret "knowing" the wrongness of one's act as appreciating the ethical significance
of the act, not just recognizing its legal wrongness. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman,
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makes clear that a competent defendant need only be able to
assist counsel in preparing his defense; he does not have to be
able to represent himself. While Dusky establishes the test for
competency only in federal cases,34 several circuit courts see
Dusky as setting forth the minimum standard for competency
to stand trial under the Constitution. 5
II. COMPETENCY DETERMINATION
A. Procedures
By looking closely at the procedures for determining com-
petency to stand trial, it is possible to identify the points in the
process where decisions are made and the factors considered in
making these decisions.36 The issue of a defendant's compe-
tency may be raised by the defense, the prosecution, the court
sua sponte, or even the defendant at any time prior to, during,
or subsequent to trial.37 Once the issue is raised, neither the
defendant nor his lawyer can waive the issue and demand
357 F.2d 606, 622-25 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959, 961-62, 40 Cal. Rptr.
271, 274 (1964).
31 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
3 Mackey v. Craven, 537 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1976); Curtis v. Zelker, 466 F.2d 1092,
1095 (2d Cir. 1972). Therefore, when federal courts consider habeas corpus petitions
from state prisoners, the federal standard will prevail. See Novle v. Sigler, 361 F.2d
673, 677 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 853 (1966).
u For several of the articles describing and proposing procedural alternatives at
different points in the decisional process, see Parker, California's New Scheme for the
Commitment of Individuals Found Incompetent to Stand Trial, 6 PAC. L.J. 484 (1957);
Note, Criminal Insanity Procedures in Kentucky, 57 Ky. L.J. 525 (1969); Note,
Competency to Stand Trial-Pre-trial Procedures, 22 Sw. L.J. 857 (1968); Note,
Mental Condition of an Accused: Pre-Trial, Trial and Post-Trial, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV.
287 (1961); Note, Procedural Protections for the Incompetent Criminal Defendant in
Texas, 2 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 89 (1970); Note, Florida's Incompetency to Stand Trial
Rule: Justice in a Straight Jacket, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 248 (1974); Comment,
Competency to Stand Trial and the Insanity Defense in Wyoming-Some Problems,
10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 229 (1975).
31 If subsequent to trial the convicted person alleges he was incompetent to stand
trial, a hearing on the issue is appropriate. Papalia v. United States, 333 F.2d 620 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 838 (1964). In People v. Laudermilk, 431 P.2d 228,
235, 61 Cal. Rptr. 644, 651, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 861 (1968), the court said an appeal
can be taken even upon a plea of guilty, since "the error goes to the question of
jurisdiction in the sense that the trial court has no power to pronounce judgment in
such a case." But see Comment, Competency to Stand Trial and the Insanity Defense
in Wyoming-Some Problems, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 229 (1975) where the Wyo-
ming statute is interpreted to mean that the only person who can raise the issue is the
defendant when he pleads.
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trial. 8 The court must investigate and determine whether there
is sufficient evidence of incompetency to require a competency-
to-stand-trial hearing. 9 Even if there is insufficient evidence to
require a competency hearing, the court may still choose to
hold a hearing to reduce the likelihood of a successful collateral
attack on the judgment resulting in an expensive retrial or a
nunc pro tunc hearing to determine retrospectiveli whether the
defendant was competent to stand trial." Prior hospitaliza-
tions, suicidal or aberrational acts, or an unsupported claim of
incompetency are usually insufficient to require a full-blown
competency hearing." On the other hand, a medical opinion
that the defendant is incompetnt to stand trial is usually
Logically, "it is contradictory to argue that the defendant may be incompetent,
and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to have a court determine his
capacity to stand trial." Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
31 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (interpretation of statutory bona fide
doubt standard); People v. Laudermilk, 431 P.2d 228, 61 Cal. Rptr. 644, cert. denied,
393 U.S. 861 (1968) (substantial evidence to raise a bona fide doubt); Via v. Common-
wealth, 522 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1975)(reasonable grounds to believe insane).
,o Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966) where Judge B azelon
ordered retrial rather than a nunc pro tunc hearing to determine retrospectively
whether the defendant had been competent during trial, since it was impossible with-
out contemporaneous testimony to determine whether the defendant had been suffer-
ing withdrawal during trial; Pouncey v. United States, 349 F.2d 699, 700 (D.C. Cir.
1965) where the court remanded for a nunc pro tunc hearing to determine whether the
behavior of the accused during trial was such as to throw doubt on the hospital's earlier
prediction of competency.
1' Plumb v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1973) where hospitalization in
Arizona two years before the armed robbery did not constitute reasonable grounds to
require a hearing on the defendant's competency, especially in light of his demon-
strated ability in the drafting of his pro se motion for a psychiatric examination and
hearing; Hicks v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1972) where a detailed affida-
vit concerning the defendant's competency did not supply reasonable grounds to make
further inquiry necessary when two doctors who examined the defendant certified that
he was not mentally ill; Dye v. Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1972) where
evidence, consisting principally of Dye's claimed lapses of memory and the testimony
of his attorney, was not sufficient to warrant a full scale hearing, in light of the fact
that the defendant recalled events other than those surrounding the shooting and
answered numerous questions relevant to the case; Matthews v. Commonwealth, 468
S.W.2d 313 (Ky.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966 (1971), where hospitalization 15 years
before the armed robbery was not of itself sufficient evidence of mental incapacity to
render clearly erroneous the trial court's failure to grant a competency hearing; Os-
borne v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 1966) where commitment to Eastern
State Hospital for examination was not sufficient reason for further investigation when
the defendant, charged with sodomy and grand larceny, escaped before examination,
in light of the fact his counsel said he understood the significance of changing his plea
from not guilty to guilty.
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enough to require a plenary hearing.42
At common law the method for determining competency
to stand trial was discretionary with the court. Today some
jurisdictions specify by statute a particular procedure the court
must follow in gathering information on the legal question of
whether the defendant should stand trial.43 The court usually
conducts the inquiry: it decides which sources could best sup-
ply information on the defendant's capacity to perform his des-
ignated functions.
With the data supplied in answer to its requests, the court
determines whether the defendant's functional impairment is
cumulatively so great that he fails to meet the minimum per-
formance level necessary for the satisfaction of due process and
the preservation of the integrity of the criminal adversary sys-
tem. While courts pay lip service to the distinction between the
medical fact of mental illness and the legal conclusion of com-
petency to stand trial, in practice once mental illness is found,
the court rarely asks the next question, whether this particular
disabling condition prevents the defendant from satisfying the
42 Via v. Commonwealth, 522 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Ky. 1975) where a hearing was
required when Via had been committed on four prior occasions and the psychiatrist
classified her as schizophrenic, even though Eastern State Hospital had released her
as competent before trial: "The fact they might warrant a finding of mental capacity
would not eliminate the necessity of a hearing." Commonwealth v. Strickland, 375
S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1964) where a current diagnosis of a paranoid condition and unfeigned
hallucinations compelled the court to order a hearing; in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375 (1966), interpreting the bona fide doubt standard for a hearing, a composite of
details should have put the court on notice that a hearing was required: a medical
incident that might have caused the disturbance-the dropping of a brick on Pate's
head at age seven; a history of disturbed behavior; prior hospitalization eight years
before the murder of his common law wife; and his attempted suicide and murder of
his 18-month-old son some years before. In Cooke, The Course Study Unit: Patient
Characteristics and Differences between Patients Judged Competent and
Incompetent, 25 J. CLIN. PSYCH. 141, 142 (1969), analysis revealed that those found
incompetent tended to be more depressed, anxious, hysterical, paranoiac, psychas-
theniac, and schizophrenic than those found competent.
11 For determination of the issue of competency to stand trial by jury, commission,
judge, or any designated group of experts, see, e.g., United States v. Maret, 433 F.2d
1064 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971); United States v. Schaffer, 433
F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1970). While there is no absolute right to trial by jury on the issue,
the judge in his discretion can direct that the question be answered by a jury along
with the principal issue or by a separate jury impaneled to decide the question. See,
e.g., Myers v. Blalock, 214 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. Va. 1963); United States v. Higgins,
103 F. Supp. 481, 483 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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test for competency.44
Even though the probability of incompetency to stand trial
is greater with some types of mental illnesses and psychopathic
symptoms,4 5 no diagnosis or label should predetermine the an-
swer to the legal question of whether the accus'ed is competent
to stand trial. 6 For instance, if an area peripheral to the subject
of the trial is distorted by delusions, or if the effect of the
delusion is easily discernible, there may not be enough distor-
tion in the defendant's perception and rationality to justify
halting the trial. In contrast, if the defendant is hallucinating
and unable to understand the proceeding, as might occur if he
thought the victim was still alive and talking to him, or if he
has such paranoid distrust that he is convinced everyone, in-
cluding his attorney, is out to get him, his mental illness is
" For information on the tendency of courts and examiners to act as if mental
illness were the exclusive criterion for competency, see generally Bennett & Matthews,
The Dilemma of Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 467 (1968); Hess
& Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 Am.
J. PSYCH. 713, 714-15 (1963)[hereinafter cited as Hess & Thomas]; McGarry, supra
note 4, at 623, 624-25 (out of 106 examined at Massachusetts State Hospital in 1960
only those diagnosed as psychotic were found incompetent); Pfeiffer, Eisenstein, &
Dabbs, Mental Competency Evaluation for the Federal Courts: L Methods and
Results, 144 J. NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 320, 325 (1967)(100% with chronic brain
syndrome, 77% with psychosis, and 62% with mental deficiency were found unfit, while
100% of those with neurosis or character disorders were found fit); Robey, Criteria for
Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 Am. J. PSYCH. 616, 621
(1965)[hereinafter cited as Robey]; Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty, and
the Law, 13 KAN. L. REV. 59, 70 (1964). For cases paying lip service to the distinction
between mental illness and competency to stand trial, see, e.g., Whalem v. United
States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965). In the final analysis
the decision is a judicial, not a medical, determination. See, e.g., United States v.
Davis, 365 F.2d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972,
974 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
11 The diagnosis of a psychosis is irrelevant except insofar that it renders
a patient incapable of participating in his trial in a sufficiently self-
protective fashion or insofar as it invades his ability to understand the reality
of the trial situation per se exclusive of other areas of disturbed reality
testing.
McGarry, supra note 4, at 625.
" For more on courts and medical examiners mistakenly basing their opinion of
incompetency on the test for commitability or making the diagnosis of psychosis or
particular descriptive symptoms determinative of whether the person is competent, see
generally Pfeiffer, Eisenstein, & Dabbs, Mental Competency Evaluation for the Fed-
eral Courts: If. Appraisal and Implications, 145 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 18
(1967)(judges admitted considering diagnosis as the primary factor); Vann & Morgan-
roth, Psychiatrists and the Competency to Stand Trial, 42 U. DET. L.J. 75, 84 (1964)
(four out of seven psychiatrists felt psychosis was a criterion).
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severe enough to warrant discontinuing trial.4 7
Although at common law the process stopped when the
defendant was found incompetent to stand trial, today some
states by statute allow a limited continuation of the proceed-
ings to determine whether the prosecution has sufficient ad-
missible evidence to bring the defendant to trial for the crime."
At common law the problem of what to do with an incompetent
defendant until he regained his competency was solved by re-
turning him to the jail until he regained his competency. With
the emergence of mental hospitals the defendant was usually
committed to a hospital for the criminally insane until he re-
gained his competency. Today due process limits the duration
17 For cases holding that an insane person may be competent to stand trial, see,
e.g., Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970
(1969) (not incompetent merely because mentally ill to some degree); Lyles v. United
States, 254 F.2d 725, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1957), overruled, 471 F.2d 969, 997 (1972)(on
unrelated grounds) where the court said, "a paranoiac or pyromaniac may well under-
stand the charges against him and be able to assist in his defense . . . ."; Crawn v.
United States, 254 F. Supp. 669 (M.D. Pa. 1966)(not incompetent merely because
emotionally unstable); Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Mo. 1951); United
States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1951); People v. Bassett, 323 N.E.2d
607 (Ill. App. 1975)(competent even though suffering from mental and emotional dis-
turbances); State v. Severns, 336 P.2d 447, 452 (Kan. 1959); Jordan v. State, 135 S.W.
327 (Tenn. 1911)(sane enough for trial though deranged on some subjects); People v.
Bryant, 71 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Ct. App. 1968) (more required than immaturity, dangerous-
ness, psychopathic, or homocidal diagnosis).
" See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368 (West Cum. Supp. 1977) stating that a
mentally incompetent person cannot be bound over for a felony until a prima facie case
is proven to the satisfaction of a magistrate during the preliminary hearing or to a
grand jury and CAL. PENAL CODE § 977.1 which permits the court to hear any matter
capable of determination without the personal consent of the defendant; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 59, § 24(a)(1972); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 95-506(4)(Cum. Supp. 1977);
N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw art. 730.60(5)(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977). In Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740-41 (1972) the Supreme Court said that states are not pre-
cluded "from allowing, at a minimum, an incompetent defendant to raise certain
defenses such as insufficiency of the indictment or to make pre-trial motions through
counsel." See, e.g., United States v. Jorgenson, 415 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Gradskay, 434 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co.,
287 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (motion regarding sufficiency of indictment). In Comment on Pre-trial
Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832, 841 (1960), Foote sug-
gests three situations when the proceedings against a defendant who may be incompe-
tent should be allowed to proceed: he should be able 1) to show if the prosecution is
barred as a matter of law, due to the running of statute of limitations, 2) to point out
defects in the prosecution's factual case that would prevent conviction, such as the
inadmissibility of evidence unlawfully obtained, or 3) to assert any affirmative de-
fense that could'be established without his participation, such as an alibi defense or
insanity.
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of any commitment to a period that is reasonable in relation
to the purpose for the commitment-the facilitation of the de-
fendant's recovery so that he may be tried with a minimum of
delay.49 In other words, the defendant can only be committed
long enough to determine if there is a probability that he will
regain competency. If recovery is not foreseeable, as may be the
case, for instance, with severe retardation, he must either be
released or civilly committed.
While most jurisdictions require that the defendant be
hospitalized for some period of time, a few offer less restrictive
alternatives after a brief period of hospitalization." If the pur-
pose of mandatory hospitalization is to protect society from
those suspected of criminal activity who cannot stand trial,
then the court, in addition to finding the defendant incompe-
tent, should also determine whether he is dangerous before
dismissing the alternative of bail with out-patient care when-
ever this option is feasible.51
While review of the defendant's progress formerly de-
pended on the initiative of the superintendent of the institution
where the defendant was confined, many jurisdictions now re-
quire that periodic progress reports be submitted to the com-
mitting court. Once the defendant is released as a result of
either habeas corpus52 or a recommendation from the institu-
tion to the court that the defendant is now competent, he is
returned to the committing court to stand trial. Frequently the
charges are dropped for minor offenses, or if the defendant does
stand trial, he is often given credit for the time he was confined
" Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730 (1972). Some jurisdictions now limit the
duration of a competency commitment to the maximum sentence for the crime the
defendant is charged with, the maximum sentence reduced by a fraction for parole, or
an arbitrary maximum for all crimes.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1374 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
" Compare the mandatory commitment of FLA. R. Cam. P. 3.210(a) with Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 51.21(6) (West 1957) where parole is possible before the charges are
dismissed or competency is restored. In federal incompetency cases it is necessary to
show dangerousness to continue to hold defendants after an initial observation period.
United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372, 1374 (4th Cir. 1969).
11 For various remedies available to the defendant who is wrongfully detained as
incompetent or tried while incompetent, see, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 112 S.W.
615 (Ky. 1908) (motion for a new trial); Ince v. State, 88 S.W. 818 (Ark. 1905)(coram
nobis); Annot., 121 A.L.R. 267 (1939); Annot., 10 A.L.R. 213 (1921); Annot., 7 A.L.R.
FED. 565, 575-97 (1971).
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prior to trial by the granting of parole or a lighter sentence than
might otherwise have been expected.
B. Effect of Misclassificatiohs
The effect of a misclassification of a defendant is either
that an incompetent defendant is forced to face trial or that a
competent defendant is deprived of his right to a speedy trial
and his right to a trial by jury before being incarcerated.13
When either error occurs, the goals promoted by the
competency-to-stand-trial doctrine are subverted: The defen-
dant is treated unfairly and the integrity of the adversary sys-
tem is diminished. Misclassification threatens the integrity of
the criminal system with decreased efficiency, a possible reduc-
tion in accuracy due to the erosion of evidence during the delay,
and increased disrespect for a system that appears to make
arbitrary decisions. Misclassifications also lessen the likelihood
that the goals justifying the imposition of sanc-
tions-punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation-will be
achieved.
Ironically, misapplication of the competency doctrine
works to the disadvantage of the defendant it was designed to
protect. For instance, if the defendant is competent, the delay
of trial is likely to weaken his defense, since with the passage
of time evidence disappears and witnesses forget. The prosecu-
tion is rarely equally disadvantaged, since by charging the de-
fendant it has already gathered and preserved some evidence,
while the defense of the incarcerated defendant provided with
appointed counsel usually awaits preparation until the defen-
dant is ready to stand trial. Delay of the trial of a defendant
who is in fact competent is likely to induce mental disorder
rather than encourage recovery, because the defendant nurses
the idea that he is being treated unjustly and he is treated by
others as if he were a disturbed person. If the defendant is
mentally ill but not incompetent to stand trial, the effect of
finding him incompetent is likely to be antitherapeutic rather
than therapeutic: He is hampered in his recovery by the fact
that he has no incentive to get well since the reward for recov-
u See Lewin, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Legal and Ethical Aspects of an
Abused Doctrine, 1969 ARiz. ST. L.J. 233.
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ery is trial and perhaps imprisonment. His chances for rehabili-
tation are also reduced, since, as an inmate in an institution
for the criminally insane rather than a patient in a mental
hospital, he is denied the opportunity to reintegrate himself
gradually into the community via off-ground privileges, and
the stigma of having been in an institution for the criminally
insane reduces his chances of being reaccepted into the com-
munity.
II. THE CONTENT OF THE COMPETENCY TEST
I believe every District Judge will and can avoid eventual
trouble and therefore administer justice more effectively if,
and only if, he approaches a Section 4244 competency hearing
on the general theory that neither the District Attorney, the
defense attorney, nor any of the witnesses, professional or
otherwise, have the vaguest idea about the purpose of the
hearing, the scope of the evidence, the specific issue for ulti-
mate decision; or, indeed, really why everyone gathered in
your courtroom."
Applying the test for competency is easy when the defen-
dant is so disabled that he cannot communicate or he is so inert
or raving that the spectacle of him in the courtroom disturbs
even the most hardened skeptic's sense of decorum and fair
play.5 With the recognition that less obvious mental disturb-
ances can be equally crippling, distinguishing incompetent
from competent defendants has become more difficult, espe-
cially when the defendant lies close to the dividing line between
competency and incompetency.
A. Identification of Defendant Functions
The question in any case is whether mental illness has dis-
abled the specific functions of personality which sound policy
in the administration of criminal justice require before the
" Judicial Hearings to Determine Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 39 F.R.D.
523, 545 (Judge Oliver, United States District Court Judge for the Western District of
Missouri) (Ninth Circuit Sentencing Institute).
" See United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1835) (No. 15,
577)(frenzy); Hess & Thomas, supra note 44, at 720.
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accused may be subjected to adversary proceedings on the
charge against him."
The fact that most cases simply state the test for compe-
tency rather than specify how the defendant failed to satisfy
the test suggests that few courts use a qualitative standard,
either to direct the gathering of information on the nature and
magnitude of the defendant's disability or to measure the per-
formance of the defendant. The importance of an operational
definition of the functions a defendant might be expected to
perform has been pointed out.57 However, there have been few
attempts to develop comprehensive guidelines describing the
kind and level of defendant participation necessary to satisfy
the test for competency to stand trial.5 1
One of the earliest specifications of the tasks a defendant
might be required to perform was developed by Robey in 1965.11
In order for a defendant to stand trial, Robey felt he must
understand his surroundings, his legal rights, the procedures,
principles, charges, verdicts, and penalties relevant to his case,
be able to provide facts, enter a plea, maintain a consistent
defense, waive his rights, interpret witness testimony, testify,
and be able to stand the stress of trial. In the 1970's one of the
products of an extensive study by the Harvard Medical School
on competency to stand trial0 was the identification of three
more capabilities a defendant might need in order to be compe-
tent to stand trial: The defendant should be able to concentrate
1, Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 820 n.6 (D.C. Cir.)(dissent), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965).
11 Pouncey v. United States, 349 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1965) where the court
recognized that competency "denotes the intellectual and emotional capacity of the
accused to perform the functions which are essential to the fairness and accuracy of a
criminal proceeding." In Incompetency, supra note 4, at 457 the observation is made
that "[t]o identify the content of that test, however, it is necessary to examine the
functions it is thought to serve."
" For articles mentioning tasks a defendant might be called on to perform, see,
e.g., Bennett, Competency to Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J. CraM. L. CIMINOL-
OGY & PoucE ScI., 569, 574 (1968) which identifies four qualities of mind a defendant
should possess: contact with reality; intelligence sufficient to grasp the significance of
what is going on; rationality sufficient to consult with counsel; memory sufficient to
reconstruct the facts surrounding the crime that could prove his innocence. See also
Figari, Competency to Stand Trial in Texas, 25 S.W. L.J. 279, 283-84 (1971).
", Robey, supra note 44, at 617.
" CENTER FOR STUDIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, CoMPETENCY To STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL ILuNss (Final Report 1973).
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on what is going on, to appraise the probability of the eventual
outcome of the trial, and to want justice rather than unde-
served punishment.
In order to assess whether, in light of current legal prac-
tices and philosophies, the defendant must be able to perform
these and other tasks, it is necessary to analyze what happens
at various stages in the criminal process. By focusing on the
events in the judicial drama in which the defendant plays a
part, it should eventually be possible to reduce the activities a
defendant must participate in down to a minimum set of func-
tions he must be able to perform in order to satisfy due process.
The defendant should appreciate what an arrest is. Unless
he understands the social dynamics of the arrest, he cannot
respond appropriately. If he does not understand the role of
each party or if he fails to recognize the situation as an arrest,
rather than a personal attack by his enemies, he may flee or
use force to free himself. Failure to understand the proper re-
sponse at this point is, however, not per se unfair to the defen-
dant, unless flight is considered probative of guilt.
The defendant should have the ability to remember and to
report his treatment by law enforcement officers. From the
time he is arrested until he is brought before a magistrate, the
accused is alone with law enforcement officers. Only the defen-
dant and the officers know whether he was instructed on his
rights, what promises were made to encourage him to talk, how
he was treated, where the arresting officers searched, how long
he was questioned, and a host of other details surrounding the
arrest. Even if there is little probability that the officers will
wilfully distort what happened, the fact remains that because
they make countless arrests, they are less likely than the defen-
dant to remember the circumstances of his particular arrest. If
the defendant is so uninterested in his own welfare that he does
not notice what happens or if he cannot accurately perceive,
remember, or communicate events from the time he was taken
into custody until the conduct of the police falls under the
watchful eye of counsel, he is denied the protections the law
gives defendants whose rights are violated by the police.
The defendant must have the ability to exercise his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Immediately after his arrest,
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the accused should be informed of his right to remain silent."
In order to receive the benefit of this warning,6" he must under-
stand that he does not have to say anything and be able to
exercise his right to remain silent if that would be in his best
interest. On the other hand, a decision to confess must be the
result of a free and knowing act in order for the confession to
be valid. 3 Therefore, if the defendant's ability to weigh the
possibility of conviction against the advantages of confession is
substantially impaired or if he cannot withstand ordinary pres-
sures of interrogation without being overborne, he can neither
intelligently nor voluntarily assert or waive his right to remain
silent.6 4
The defendant should have the ability to exercise his right
to counsel. After arrest, the accused must be informed of his
right to hire a lawyer and his right to have one appointed to
represent him if he is indigent. 5 In order to exercise this right,
' The purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the fifth
amendment and applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment, is to preserve
the integrity of the judicial system by refusing to allow the state to use its superior
force to coerce suspected law breakers into convicting themselves. See, e.g., Mills v.
Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230, 238 (1959); United States v. Interborough Delicatessan Deal-
ers Ass'n, 235 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The reason for excluding evidence so
obtained is not only that it may be untrustworthy but also that the method used to
abstract the information offends constitutional principles of due process. See, e.g.,
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 596, 602 (1944); Rivera-Vargas v. United States, 307 F.
Supp. 1075 (D. Puerto Rico 1969).
£2 See People v. Randolph, 294 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1968) where a mental defective was
found unable to waive Miranda warnings.
0 If the defendant can show he did not voluntarily waive his privilege against self-
incrimination, but was coerced into making admissions by threats, promises, or the
exertion of improper influence by law enforcement authorities, the incriminating state-
ments are inadmissible. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Many factors
bear on the issue of the voluntariness of a statement-the person's age, education,
intelligence level, the period of detention, length of the interrogation, techniques of
interrogation, absence of counsel, and the failure to advise the defendant of his right
to counsel and to remain silent. United States ex rel. Monks v. Warden, 339 F. Supp.
30 (D.N.J. 1972).
11 The probability that the defendant was not sane when he made a confession is
a factor in determining whether a confession was illegally obtained. E.g., Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); United
States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
95 The right to counsel requires that indigent defendants be afforded the assistance
of counsel at critical stages in the criminal proceedings. United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967). The right to counsel applies to all serious offenses, whether felonies
or misdemeanors. United States ex rel. Singleton v. Woods, 440 F.2d 835 (7th Cir.
1971). The guiding hand of counsel is essential at the preliminary hearing to guard
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the defendant must understand the nature of the charge, the
allowable range of punishments, his right to request a lawyer,6
and the probability of conviction. If the defendant decides to
waive counsel, his choice must be knowingly and voluntarily
made,67 and, therefore, the waiver of counsel by a defendant
who is unable to assess the value of counsel is not binding.68
The defendant must understand the nature of the crime
and the range of possible penalties. Soon after arrest the pris-
oner is brought before a judicial officer who informs him of the
nature of the charge and advises him of his rights.69 Unless he
understands what acts constitute the crime with which he is
charged, he cannot intelligently exercise his rights, since he
cannot know whether he is saying something incriminating,
whether he in fact did or did not commit the acts, why it might
appear that he committed the crime, whether there is a simple
way to extricate himself, or whether the severity of the charge
or the likelihood of conviction warrants his having a lawyer.
The defendant must appreciate the consequences of any
waiver. During the appearance before the magistrate the defen-
dant may be asked whether he consents to the removal of his
case to another jurisdiction, whether he wants counsel, whether
he consents to a waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing to
determine probable cause or his right to an indictment. 0 If he
against an improper prosecution. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970). The line-
up is not a critical stage. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
,1 United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277 (3rd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 850 (1965).
11 Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938).
0 E.g., Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966); Hall v. Johnston, 103 F.2d 900
(9th Cir. 1939). The presumption of competency may overcome the defendant's mere
contention he is insane. Collins v. Johnston, 29 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
" The fundamental purpose of bringing the accused before a commissioner "is to
make certain that a person arrested is advised by a judicial officer of his constitutional
right to counsel and of his privilege against self-incrimination 'without unnecessary
delay,"' Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 923 (1965).
" A defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing to determine whether the state
has sufficient evidence to justify binding the accused over for trial and/or a right to a
grand jury indictment whenever the offense is punishable by more than one year.
Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 407 (1956). The defendant must be prosecuted
by indictment for all felonies, unless he waives his right in open court, but he cannot
waive his right to indictment if he is charged with a capital offense. United States v.
East, 5 F.R.D. 389 (N.D. Ind. 1946); FED. R. Cram. P. 7. Since misdemeanors may be
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does not waive the preliminary hearing or his right to counsel,
the magistrate sets a date for the hearing and assigns him
counsel if he is indigent. Before he can intelligently waive any
of these rights, however, he must have some understanding of
what the benefits of asserting and the consequences of waiving
the particular right are.71 For instance, he cannot waive his
privilege against self-incrimination unless he is able to under-
stand that what he says can later be used against him.72 The
waiver of a right involves the ability to judge whether assertion
or waiver of the right best furthers his interests, and making
the best choice requires that the defendant know and be able
to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each option.
Since an incompetent person may be abnormally susceptible to
pressures to waive his rights, waivers must be carefully scruti-
nized whenever there is any suspicion that the defendant may
be incompetent.73
Before having to suffer the expense, inconvenience, and
embarrassment of trial, the defendant is entitled to a judicial
determination of whether the state has sufficient evidence to
bring him to trial,74 unless he has waived his right to a prelimi-
nary hearing or a grand jury indictment. 5 If the evidence is
insufficient to establish the necessary elements of the crime,
the charge is dismissed. But, usually, the defendant will have
to demonstrate that some of the "facts" necessary for a prima
facie case have not been proven to the extent a reasonable man
could find the defendant guilty of the crime. In order to prove
that the state is mistaken about some of the essential facts, the
prosecuted by information, there is no need for the defendant to waive his right to an
indictment if the offense is only a misdemeanor. United States v. Solomon, 216 F.
Supp. 835 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
11 As with any other waiver, the waiver of an indictment must be knowingly and
voluntarily made. E.g., United States v. Culbert, 215 F. Supp. 333 (D. Mo. 1963).
72 Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 314 (1912).
7 United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
7, E.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 44 (1951) stating that there must
be adequate grounds to justify prosecution; Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463
(1888) in which the question focused on during the preliminary hearing is "whether a
case is made out which will justify holding the accused, either by imprisonment or
under bail, to ultimately answer to an indictment, or other proceeding, in which he
shall be finally tried upon the charge made against him."
11 There is no need for a preliminary hearing if a grand jury indicts. Boone v.
United States, 280 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960).
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defendant must either testify himself or call witnesses in his
behalf.
The defendant should be able to relate what happened at
the time of the crime. Unless the defendant recalls what hap-
pened, he cannot tell his story himself, identify other witnesses
to verify his story, or point out to his attorney inaccuracies in
the testimony of other witnesses. If the defendant's perception
at the time of the crime or his memory of the events is dis-
torted, he is ill-equipped to assist counsel in rebutting the pros-
ecution's version of the alleged crime. Since many crimes de-
pend on the state of mind of the accused at the time of the
criminal act-his intent, knowledge, premeditation-the de-
fendant must be able to recount his feelings at the time of the
crime. While it may sometimes be possible to reconstruct what
happened without the defendant's help, under most circum-
stances the defendant is disadvantaged by his inability to re-
member.
The defendant must understand the legal defenses avail-
able to him. Unless the defendant appreciates the meaning of
a legal defense, he cannot select the facts which might be rele-
vant. For instance, when the defense is self defense, its success
may depend upon the defendant's recollection of any motive
the person had for attacking him; but if he cannot understand
his lawyer's explanation of the defense, he is unable to select
from his past crucial facts he may know.
The defendant must be able to testify intelligently if he is
to take the stand. During the preliminary hearing and later at
trial, the defendant has the right to testify in his own behalf."6
"' The rationale for the fifth amendment prohibition against compelling a defen-
dant in a criminal proceeding to be a witness against himself is that it is unfair to force
him to choose between possible conviction for a crime and contempt or perjury pro-
ceedings: "Answer truthfully and you have given evidence leading to conviction for
violation of federal law; answer falsely and you will be convicted of perjury; refuse to
answer and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt. ... Aiuppa v. United
States, 201 F.2d 287, 300 (6th Cir. 1952). The defendant asserts the privilege by refus-
ing to answer questions that would connect him with a crime. United States v. Cefalu,
338 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1964). The defendant waives the privilege as far as the circum-
stances connecting him to the crime now being prosecuted by voluntarily taking the
stand or entering a guilty plea. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196
(1943); Day v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Va. 1969). Any waiver of the privilege
must be voluntarily and intelligently made. E.g., United States v. Michael, 426 F.2d
1067 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Doremus, 414 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1969).
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With the aid of counsel, he must determine whether taking the
stand would help or hinder his defense.7 In order to testify he
should accurately remember what happened, be able to under-
stand the questions, and be able to formulate answers describ-
ing what he experienced. Moreover, in order to testify, he, like
any other witness, must appreciate the necessity for telling the
truth on the stand and be able to do so.78 If he is to be effective,
his demeanor and testimony must convince the jury that he is
in fact telling the truth. Like other witnesses he is also subject
to cross examination to test his credibility. Unlike the fairly
supportive relationship existing between defense counsel and
the defendant, the hostile atmosphere during cross examina-
tion demands that the defendant be able to withstand interro-
gation without collapsing or being led into damaging, even un-
true admissions-a real possibility for a defendant of abnormal
suggestibility or subnormal rationality. Once on the stand he
still has the right to refuse to answer questions, that would
connect him with crimes other than the one for which he is
being tried." For this reason, the defendant must be able to
judge when he must answer in order to avoid contempt and
when he does not have to answer because the answer would link
him with another crime.
The defendant must be able to decide how to plead. Once
the court is satisfied that the state has introduced sufficient
evidence to convince a reasonable man of the defendant's guilt,
the court may halt the preliminary hearing and demand that
the defendant answer the charge by pleading guilty, not guilty,
or, for some minor offenses, nolo contendere10 Without auto-
" The government can point out that the evidence is uncontradicted or unex-
plained, but not that the defendant did not take the stand. Robilio v. United States,
291 F. 975, 985 (6th Cir. 1923). However, the failure to take the stand is open, practi-
cally if not legally, to inferences against the defendant. Once on the stand the defen-
dant is subject to cross examination to test his veracity and credibility and must
answer questions relating to the crime under consideration. Martin v. United States,
404 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1968).
71 United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1969).
11 If a defendant refuses to answer a proper question on cross examination, he can
be punished for contempt of court. Carpenter v. United States, 264 F.2d 565, 570 (4th
Cir. 1959). If it were subsequently found that he was insane at the time he committed
contempt, the primary case might have to be reversed. Rollerson v. United States, 343
F.2d 269, 270 (1964).
M Giordenello v. United States, 241 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 480
(1958).
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matically rejecting or accepting the advice of his lawyer, the
defendant must be able to decide which plea option he prefers
after the advantages of each alternative are explained. After
the entry of a plea of not guilty, the court sets a date for trial,
and the defendant is either returned to jail or released on bail
to await trial. With the assistance of counsel, the defendant
must convince the judge that he is not dangerous and that he
can be trusted to appear for trial in order for the judge to grant
bail.
A defendant should appreciate the consequences of enter-
ing a plea of guilty. Since the results of a guilty plea are so
drastic, 81 the court must carefully ascertain whether the defen-
dant appreciates the consequences of entering the plea and
whether there is a basis in fact for the guilty plea.2 A defendant
cannot appreciate the effect of entering a guilty plea if he does
not understand the charges against him, the penalties for the
crime, possible defenses available to him, and the circumstan-
ces under which evidence is generally inadmissible.13 If the de-
fendant is incompetent, he cannot enter a guilty plea any more
than he can be tried for the crime.84
The defendant should be able to persuade the court that
he can perform his part in the process. Since the issue at the
,, A plea of guilty is not only an indirect waiver of such rights as the right to a
jury trial, to confront one's accusers, and to testify in one's own behalf, but also is a
waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects, such as the inadmissibility of evidence. Weir
v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir. 1937).
82 The court must be convinced that the plea is voluntarily made with a full
knowledge of the effects of the waiver and full understanding of the facts on which the
decision to waive is based. E.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962);
Shelton v. United States, 292 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1961); Fogus v. United States, 34 F.2d
197, 198 (4th Cir. 1929); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 requires an inquiry in open court as to
whether the defendant realizes all the consequences of entering a guilty plea and
whether there is a basis in fact for the guilty plea. A plea is not voluntary if induced
by promises or threats of law enforcement agents. E.g., Monroe v. United States, 463
F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1972).
13 If a plea is made under the pressure of false information, it may not be volun-
tary. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)(incorrect information on the
admissibility of evidence); United States v. Martin, 389 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1968)(defen-
ses); Fultz v. United States, 365 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1966); Munich v. United States,
337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964)(penalties).
84 If the defendant later proves that he was incompetent when he entered the
guilty plea, it is invalid. E.g., Tweedy v. United States, 435 F.2d 702 (8th Cir.
1970) (valid guilty plea by alcoholic); Sturrup v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
N.C. 1963) (psychotic unable to enter guilty plea); Johnson v. Settle, 209 F. Supp. 279
(D. Mo. 1962).
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preliminary hearing is whether the defendant ought to stand
trial at all rather than whether he is guilty, the question of
competency to stand trial is often raised at this point. Even the
defendant may put the court on notice that a competency hear-
ing may be required by reporting previous hospitalizations for
mental illness or other facts probative of incompetency. How-
ever, since an incompetent defendant usually does not recog-
nize or want to admit that he is incompetent, the question of
whether a psychiatric examination is necessary is usually
raised by the defense attorney, the prosecution, or even the
court itself after observation of the defendant's behavior. Once
the defendant is suspected of being incompetent, by definition
he is no longer required to to do anything to help himself.
The defendant must be able to appreciate the drama un-
folding in the courtroom. To do this, he must understand some-
thing about the interacting roles of the prosecutor, the defense
counsel, the judge, the jury, the witnesses, and the defendant.
The defendant must understand enough about the plot of the
unfolding drama to know what the possible endings might be
and the effect of each outcome on him. In order to decide
whether he needs counsel or should plea bargain or plead
guilty, he must have a fairly realistic idea of what the outcome
is likely to be.
The defendant must be able to decide whether to waive his
right to a jury trial. While the defendant has a right to a jury
trial in most criminal cases, 5 he may waive this right by re-
questing that the court act as fact finder or by entering a plea
of guilty. 6 In order to select the alternative which best serves
his interests, he must appreciate the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the judge serving as fact finder or the advantages of
entering a guilty plea after plea bargaining.
13 A person accused of a serious crime has a right to a trial by jury. Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). An offense is not petty if imprisonment for more than six
months is authorized. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). Any provision in the
Bill of Rights fundamental to a fair trial is obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth
amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
A' The defendant may waive his right to a jury trial by requesting that the court
act as the fact finder or by pleading guilty. Ferracane v. United States, 47 F.2d 677,
679 (7th Cir. 1931). In federal court, he must have court approval. FED. R. CRiM. P.
23. Even then, he must have the requisite mentality to make a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to ajury trial. Dranow v. United States, 325 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1963).
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The defendant must be able to approve, participate in,
and adhere to a defense strategy. Once the facts are supplied
by the defendant, defense counsel can map out an over-all
strategy for the defendant's approval. Once the defendant ac-
cepts a basic defense plan, he must be able to follow his part
in the plan, maintain a consistent stance throughout the trial
without vacillating from one position to another for inadequate
reasons, and be able to concentrate and care enough about
what is going on to monitor what happens during trial. If the
defendant is unrepresented he has the more difficult task of
selecting and implementing a plan.
Though the burden of proof on the state is greater at trial
than at the preliminary hearing, the similarity between the
purposes of the preliminary hearing and the full-blown
trial-establishing whether the state has made a case against
the accused-explains why many of the functions the defen-
dant is asked to perform during the trial may already have
performed during the preliminary hearing. For instance, the
defendant must decide on a plea. Unless he wants to risk the
chance of the state failing to prove a prima facie case, the
defendant must introduce enough evidence to persuade a juror
that he did not commit the crime, lacked the requisite state of
mind, was not criminally accountable for his act, or was guilty
of a lesser offense. To exercise his right to confront the wit-
nesses against him effectively, he must know what happened
at the time of the crime and appreciate the nature of the crime
and possible defenses open to him. If necessary, he must be
able to testify in his own behalf.
The defendant should be able to recognize circumstances
that may warrant his receiving a lighter sentence. After the
jury enters a verdict of guilty, the court addresses the defen-
dant personally before imposing sentence and asks him if he
has any information to present that might provide a reason for
mitigating his punishment. The defendant must understand as
a result of counsel's explanation what extenuating circumstan-
ces are. If he is unrepresented by counsel, he must know when
asked which factors may lessen the reprehensibility of his act.
Since an independent pre-sentence investigation can uncover
more mitigating circumstances in the defendant's background
and environment than even a competent defendant would be
likely to recognize, the ability to perform this function may not
be crucial for competency.
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The defendant should appreciate that he has the right to
appeal. After imposing sentence, the court advises the defen-
dant that he has the right to appeal. At this time the value of
his participation lies in his vested interest in continuing the
fight until he has exhausted all avenues of recourse, especially
if he knows he has undeservedly been found guilty. To exercise
this right, the defendant must understand his right to appeal
and must know how to appeal. Ironically, if the defendant was
an undetected incompetent during trial and remains or be-
comes incompetent subsequent to trial, it is unlikely that he
will know how to exercise his right to appeal anymore than he
knew how to defend himself during trial.
The defendant should be able to dismiss his lawyer when
the representation is inadequate. The defendant should be able
to judge whether his lawyer is providing him with adequate
guidance by observing whether the lawyer takes advantage of
weaknesses exposed and whether he vigorously implements the
basic defense plan agreed upon. To determine whether his law-
yer is representing him as well as can reasonably be expected,
the defendant must have some idea of what kind of representa-
tion he realistically should expect. The accuracy of this assess-
ment of his lawyer's conduct may depend on whether the de-
fendant's perception is distorted by paranoia or other fantasies.
Once he is confident that the representation is inadequate, the
defendant must have the initiative to dismiss his lawyer or the
competence to raise the question of inadequate representation
in order to justify a replacement of appointed counsel.
A defendant unable to perform one function will probably
be unable, in varying degrees, to perform other functions. A
person who cannot appreciate the significance of the courtroom
drama certainly cannot adhere to a general defense strategy. At
some point the defendant's power to perform his functions be-
comes so disproportionately weak in relation to the power of the
state prosecuting that it is no longer fair to continue the con-
test.
B. An Unconditional Function-Based Test
A defendant may be unfit to stand trial if his performance
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is impaired because he is mentally ill, 7 retarded,88 suffering
from amnesia," suffering from drug use or its abrupt discontin-
uance,9" alcoholic,91 diabetic92 or epileptic,93 or suffering from
physical injuries or diseases. 4 The issue is whether the dis-
abling condition so impairs the defendant's ability to perform
" E.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)(mental disorder caused by physical
disease or trauma); People v. Swallow, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
11 E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717-19 (1972); Edwards v. State, 254
A.2d 719 (Md. 1969)(defendant with an intelligence quotient of 76 competent to plead
guilty to robbery); State v. Caralluzzo, 228 A.2d 693 (N.J. 1967)(imbeciles with a
mental age of six incompetent).
" See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968)(impaired
memory due to permanent retrograde amnesia); United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp.
972 (W.D. Mo. 1964)(defense sufficient if amnesiac's assistance not needed); United
States v. Olvera, 4 C.M.A. 134, 15 C.M.R. 134 (1954)(amnesiacs consistently found
competent to stand trial in military courts); State v. Severns, 336 P.2d 447 (Kan.
1959)(amnesiac competent since a record from the first trial was available); State v.
Swails, 66 So. 2d 796 (La. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955) (amnesiac competent
since pleading not guilty by reason of insanity rather than arguing he did not commit
the act); Carter v. State, 21 So. 2d 404 (Miss. 1945) where the court said,
[N]o one shall be tried for the commission of a crime when he is mentally
incapable of making a rational defense, i.e., incapable of remembering and
intelligently stating the facts on which his defense rests. This mental condi-
tion may be casual, temporary or permanent and it may result from any
cause.
See also Regina v. Podola, [1960] 1 Q.B. 325 (amnesia alone is never enough since
insanity is necessary for incompetency). See Comment, Criminal Law-Ability to
Stand Trial-Amnesia, 52 IowA L. Rav. 339 (1966) where the rationale for holding
amnesiacs competent is criticized.
" See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1962); Harris v. United
States, 426 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1970)(a person under the influence of drugs at the time
of pleading was found incompetent); Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920, 922
(D.C. Cir. 1966)(the use or discontinuance of narcotics might per se be sufficient to
require an examination and a competency hearing). See generally Buschman & Reed,
Tranquilizers and Competency to Stand Trial, 54 A.B.A.J. 284 (1968); Scrignar,
Tranquilizers and the Psychotic Defendant, 53 A.B.A.J. 43 (1967); Case note, 45 Tax.
L. REv. 565 (1967).
1, See In re Buchanan, 61 P. 1120 (Cal. 1900) in which alcoholism did not preclude
trial when the defendant could meet the test for competency even though his character
had been altered and he was permanently insane.
92 See Featherston v. Mitchell, 418 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
937 (1970), where a mistrial in a tax evasion case was granted due to a diabetic
blackout during trial.
"3 See, e.g., Gann v. Gough, 79 F. Supp. 912, 914 (N.D. Ga. 1948), rev'd on other
grounds, 170 F.2d 473 (1948) (a person who had an epileptic seizure on the day that a
plea was entered might be competent).
" See, e.g., Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 129 (1906); United States v. Sermon,
228 F. Supp. 972, 980 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (loss of memory due to cerebral arterioscle-
rosis).
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his functions that he cannot satisfy the competency test. While
it may seem obvious that the source of the disablement should
not affect the competency decision, courts are sometimes mis-
led by limiting words in the preface to statutory tests9 5 that
suggest that the dysfunction must be a result of designated
causes, regardless of the defendant's actual degree of impair-
ment. Just as none of the conditions referred to above can
automatically be rejected as a possible reason for incompe-
tency, none can be accepted as equivalent to a finding of in-
competency, since the effect of the disablement may not be
great enough to warrant halting the criminal process.
One reason given for the restriction of the competency-to-
stand-trial doctrine to the mentally ill or retarded is a desire
to protect society. When a dangerous but not insane amnesiac
is in fact incompetent to stand trial, the court is sometimes
reluctant to find him incompetent due to fear that he will be
released once it becomes obvious that his condition cannot be
alleviated. It is probably constitutionally impermissible under
the due process clause to declare a person competent to stand
trial if he is in fact incompetent, though not civilly commit-
able, in order to fill in a gap in the law.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE COMPETENcY TEST
A. An Organizational Tool
In addition to the development of a normative standard to
describe the functions a defendant might have to perform in
order to satisfy the test for competency to stand trial, there is
a need for the formulation of an easily useable method for the
organization and presentation of data on the effect of the defen-
dant's disability on his capacity to perform the required func-
tions. One vehicle a court could use to structure the analysis
" But see, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1977) recognizing that the disabling condition can
be caused by factors other than insanity, in that a person who is "presently insane or
otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the nature of the
proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense" is incompetent.
" See, e.g., Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1966) in which
the court recognizes that, since the effect of narcotics varies with the amount of drug
taken, the degree of tolerance, and the idosyncratic reaction of the person, it is only
by a hearing that it can be determined whether any particular defendent is incompe-
tent because of his use of drugs.
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of each function is a simple four-parameter paradigm. Each
parameter focuses on one of the factors necessary for the
achievement of a voluntary action: 1) the defendant must want
to perform the function; 2) the defendant must know the con-
cepts and facts necessary for the performance of the function;
3) the defendant must know how to perform the function; and
4) the defendant must have the physical and emotional capac-
ity to actualize in conduct the desired behavior. With such a
simple paradigm for the analysis of behavior, the medical ex-
aminer or, for that matter, counsel, the court, or any witness
can graphically depict the manner in which the defendant's
impairment is likely to disable him in his performance of any
function.
Using the four-parameter paradigm to describe the effect
of a defendant's disability on his ability to perform one of the
functions described in the preceding section of this Note de-
monstates how the paradigm works. It should be pointed out
that the thumbnail sketch which follows is not meant to be
exhaustive, but merely suggestive, of the sub-functions that
impinge on each of the parameters and affect the individual's
ability to perform the function.
To be able to relate what happened at the time of the
crime is one of the basic functions the defendant should be able
to perform. To particularize the "want" parameter it is neces-
sary to identify which wants, desires, motivations, or drives are
required for the successful performance of this function. The
defendant must trust his attorney in order to feel free enough
to divulge what he perceives to be the true facts." An inability
to trust involves more than a general distrust of lawyers or a
deliberate decision to lie. A paranoid defendant who believes
that his lawyer and the rest of the world are out to get him
would be deficient in his capacity to trust;98 but some kinds of
11 Pouncey v. United States, 349 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1965)(the court recog-
nized the need for the defendant to trust counsel enough to communicate to him the
truth).
" See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 360 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1966) where
Judge Bazelon said he doubted that a schizophrenic should be allowed to withdraw
his appeal when he conceivably was motivated by self-defeating aims, such as the
characteristic of a sehizophrenic in remission to deny at all costs that he was ever ill;
Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920, 923 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1966) where the court
pointed out that the use of heroin might lower "tensions that are actually healthy and
perhaps essential for proper participation in an adversary court proceeding . . .;
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paranoia would not affect the defendant's ability to trust his
lawyer, as, for instance, the defendant's murdering his wife in
the belief that she was trying to poison him.
In order to perform almost any function, the defendant
must have a desire for self-preservation. The defendant may
not possess this self-preservation drive if he is experiencing
suicidal depression, longs for punishment for reasons unrelated
to the crime, desires martyrdom, or feels no concern for himself
due to his immersion in the euphoria created by drugs or his
withdrawal from reality.
To particularize the "know" parameter it is necessary to
identify which facts and concepts are required for the success-
ful performance of this function. Basically the defendant must
know what he did and felt at the time of the alleged crime in
order to furnish counsel with an accurate account of the facts
and the names of possible witnesses.9 Forgetting irrelevant or
undisputed facts is not enough to prevent the defendant from
advising counsel concerning the broad facts of his case. ' If the
defendant imperfectly perceived or does not remember what
happened at the time of the criminal act, he is deprived of
whatever value his eye-witness version of the events might
have. A defendant who is unable to remember what happened
due to hallucinations, epilepsy, amnesia or dotage is deficient
in the factual knowledge necessary to perform this function. If
after careful explanation the defendant cannot understand
which facts are relevant to his defense, the defendant may be
Commonwealth v. Harrison, 173 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1961) where the defendant unsuc-
cessfully argued that his self-inflicted brain injury after shooting his wife blunted his
emotional awareness of his peril to such an extent that he was incompetent.
" E.g., Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 729-30 (D.C. Cir. 1957), overruled
on other grounds, 471 F.2d 969, 997 (1972) (where the defendant was required to furnish
counsel with an accurate account of the facts and the names of possible witnesses);
United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1906) stating that the defendant,
although not entirely sane, is competent if he "has such possession and control of his
mental power, including the facts of memory, as will enable him to testify intelligently
and give his counsel all of the material facts bearing upon the criminal act charged
against him and material to repel the incriminating evidence." See also Common-
wealth v. Zelenski, 191 N.E. 355, 357 (Mass. 1934) in which the medical evidence fell
short of "proving that the mental infirmities of the defendant deprived him of the
faculties of the consciousness of the physical acts performed by him, of the power to
retain them in his memory, and of the capacity to make a statement of these acts with
reasonable accuracy."
I" United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972, 977-81 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
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deficient in his ability to grasp the concepts necessary for the
performance of this function.
To particularize the "know how" parameter, it is neces-
sary to identify which skills are necessary for the successful
performance of this function. The defendant probably has the
requisite skill to satisfy this parameter if he can provide rele-
vant details in answer to his attorney's questions. In addition
to understanding questions and being able to assess his experi-
ences to answer the questions, he must be able to articulate the
answer in an intelligible, even if idiosyncratic, manner.'1 A
defendant who is irrational due to prolonged drug or alcohol
addiction or severe retardation would probably drop below ac-
ceptable standards for the "know how" parameter of this func-
tion.
Even if a defendant has the needed motivation, knowl-
edge, and skill to perform a particular function, he still may
lack the capacity to perform the function. For instance, a per-
son may know what happened and want to relate it, but be
unable to because he is paralyzed, lacks the initiative to relate
details unless specifically asked for them, or is unable to con-
centrate long enough to reconstruct what happened.
Everyone laments the lack of communication between law
and psychology. By using the four-parameter paradigm, better
communication between the court and experts may be
achieved. If the court fails to request specific information from
the expert, the unguided expert has to base his opinion on
whatever factors he considers relevant. If he speaks in conclu-
sory terms, the court, not supplied with the specific informa-
tion necessary to form an independent opinion, must rubber-
stamp the expert's pronouncement. In order to use the exper-
tise of the expert and yet assert its role as decision-maker, the
,0I E.g., United States v. Horowitz, 360 F. Supp. 772, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1973) in which
the revelation of facts to counsel, including remembering the events in general and
being able to understand questions concerning the events, was recognized as "the
primary assistance" the defendant gives counsel; Wieter v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318
(W.D. Mo. 1961) holding that a requirement for the release of a person judged incom-
petent on habeas corpus is that he be able "to tell his lawyer the circumstances to the
best of his mental ability, (whether colored or not by mental aberration) the facts
surrounding him at the time and place where the law violation is alleged to have been
committed . . . ."; State v. Swails, 66 So. 2d 796, 800 (La. 1953), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 983 (1955) recognizing that retardates have special trouble remembering and
relating facts clearly and convincingly.
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court must specifically identify for the expert the information
that is needed. 0 2 With specific information the court can indi-
cate which tasks the defendant cannot perform that cumula-
tively render him incompetent. 1
This Note identifies and describes the functions a defen-
dant might be expected to perform during criminal prosecu-
tion. If the prosecution and defense sketch out their antici-
pated strategies for the court, the court can select from its list
of potential functions those the defendant in this particular
trial will actually be called upon to perform. Should the court
need medical information on the manner in which the defen-
dant's disorder impairs his ability to perform any function, the
court can request such specific information from the expert.
Such requests for information enable the expert to answer
questions that are properly the subject of his expertise rather
than legal questions.
B. Factors Influencing Judgment
By implementing the function-paradigm scheme pre-
sented in this Note, the court should receive relevant, proba-
tive information on which to base its decision. The court, not
the medical expert, should apply the test for competency to
stand trial to the data collected and determine whether the
defendant can perform the functions required to the extent
necessary to satisfy the due process requirement for a fair trial.
Deciding whether a defendant is competent is ultimately a
value judgment resulting from a balancing of the competing
goals of fair treatment for those impaired and unhindered exe-
cution of justice."3 The scales should be weighed in favor of the
defendant's standing trial, and therefore the doctrine should be
invoked only when the accuracy, fairness, dignity, in short, the
vitality of the system for the administration of criminal justice
is threatened.'
102 See, e.g., Hess & Thomas, supra note 44, at 718; Slovenko, Psychiatry, Crimi-
nal Law, and the Role of the Psychiatrist, 1963 DuKE L.J. 395, 410.
20 Judges differ in the level of awareness they require and the amount of emotional
instability they will tolerate, and lawyers differ in the degree of collaboration they find
necessary. This has caused some to question whether the criteria for determining
competency to stand trial can ever transcend these subjective differences. Freiberg,
supra note 4, at 147; Robey, supra note 44, at 620.
I" To err and send an incompetent to trial may be less disasterous than halting
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Between the data collection and the decision stage lies the
evaluative process. While it is impossible to know the weight
assigned to various factors in reaching the judgment, it is possi-
ble to identify the factors that the court is likely to consider.
The nature of the crime and the extent to which the defen-
dant's participation at trial is necessary interact with the de-
fendant's disability so that the court must decide on a case-by-
case basis whether the defendant is competent to participate
in the manner and to the extent the circumstances of his par-
ticular case demand.
While the success of a play rarely depends on the adroit-
ness with which a bit actor plays his part, the performance of
the defendant must meet minimal competency standards re-
gardless of how small his part is, since he is the person around
whom the drama revolves.' 5 Just as some roles are easier to
perform than others, a defendant may be able to play one part
but not another.' The pivotal question is always whether the
defendant can perform the personal functions required in the
particular proceedings.
For instance, if the defendant takes the witness stand, he
must be able to function at a higher level than if he remains
passively in his seat.107 On the witness stand he must endure
the strain of cross examination: He must be able to withstand
trial when the defendant is competent, since "a system which presupposes innocence
requires that preconviction sanctions be kept at a minimum consistent with assuring
an opportunity for the process to run its course." Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice,
69 YALE L.J. 543, 549-50 (1960).
I Just as a fact is either relevant or irrelevant, a defendant is either competent
or incompetent to perform his functions. However, just as some facts are more proba-
tive than others, so too the performance of some functions require more complex
thought processes and skills. In Thomas v. Morrow, 361 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Ky. 1962),
the court denied that there are multiple levels of competency:
[Tihe same lack of mental capacity which denied to petitioner the faculty
to plead properly to the indictment also made him incapable of recognizing
error, feeling aggrieved and prosecuting an appeal to correct it. If he did not
have the capacity to plead to the indictment he also lacked the capacity to
protect himself by appealing to this Court.
I" In People v. Andrews, Crim. No. 39181 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., June,
1966) the judge focused on how the existence of mental illness would interfere with the
defendant's actual participation in the trial and decided that since his sole defense was
insanity and no personal participation in the trial was proposed, his psychosis was not
reason enough to delay trial.
I" See Robey, supra note 44, at 619.
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stress without collapsing and his demeanor must convince the
jury that he is telling the truth. Sometimes external circum-
stances, such as the existence of corroborating witnesses, may
reduce the necessity that his testimony be clear and persuasive
since with this backup his confused comments may make
sense.
The waiver rather than assertion of a right may require a
higher functional level, since an unwaived right protects the
interests of the defendant even though he is unaware of the
interests that are protected. On the other hand, waiver of a
right requires that the defendant appreciate the consequences
of his waiver. ' It has been argued that the simultaneous
waiver of many rights-the right to a jury trial, the right to
confront witnesses, and so forth-by pleading guilty may re-
quire greater functional capacity' 9 than the sequential waivers
of the same rights, but the prevailing view is that there is no
difference.1"0
The type of crime, the complexity of the issues, argu-
ments, and procedures, and the anticipated duration of the
trial all may affect the functional level required for compe-
tency."' A defendant who would deteriorate under the pro-
longed stress of a lengthy murder or conspiracy trial may be
able to stand trial for assault. A defendant with a low intelli-
gence quotient may be able to understand the charge for in-
decent exposure but not for tax evasion.
While the penalty for the crime may affect the maximum
period of confinement for treatment, this should not per se be
a factor in determining competency to stand trial. It is true
that less participation may be required of a defendant when the
'8 E.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (entry of a guilty plea); Carnley
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (waiver of counsel).
I" E.g., Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Williams, 165 F.
Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1958) holding that a greater degree of awareness is required for a
guilty plea than for competency to stand trial; Comment, Competence to Plead Guilty:
A New Standard, 1974 DUKE L.J. 149, 151.
tie E.g., Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1006 (1973); State v.
Contreras, 542 P.2d 17 (Ariz. 1975) in which the Arizona Supreme Court recently
rejected the idea that a finding of competency to stand trial was insufficient to support
a finding of competency to plead guilty.
' See Person, The Accused.Retardate, 4 COLuM. HuMN IPRiors L. Ray. 239, 245
(1972).
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crime is a malum prohibitum offense that does not require
proof of the accused's state of mind,12 but the level of partici-
pation is less, not because the crime is a minor crime, but
because the denial of specific intent is not a possible defense.
The extent of the defendant's participation necessarily in-
creases where an element of the offense is specific intent,
knowledge, willfulness, or other mental attitudes that the de-
fendant alone may have knowledge of.113
While the general rule is that the prosecution must prove
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, with
some defenses the burden of going forward may lie on the de-
fendant, or presumptions may shift the burden to the defen-
dant."' When this occurs, greater participation is required from
the defendant since he is often the primary source for informa-
tion establishing negative facts,"5 lack of knowledge," entrap-
112 Intent does not always have to be specifically proven, but can be inferred from
the doing of the act, since a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his act. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). The act is
sufficient in itself for establishing intent if there is a rational connection between the
fact known and the ultimate fact presumed. See, e.g., McClain v. United States, 417
F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1969) (concealing marijuana). The defendant can overcome this
presumption by his own uncorroborated testimony if the jury believes him. See, e.g.,
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
"I If intent is an element of the offense charged, it must be specifically proven.
United States v. Jones, 328 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1971). The defendant can testify
that he did not have the requisite knowledge or bad motive. Haigler v. United States,
172 F.2d 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1949). Generally, knowledge and intent are necessary
elements in theft and fraud crimes. E.g., United States v. Jones, 328 F. Supp. 556
(E.D. Tenn. 1971) (counterfeiting); Lindgren v. United States, 260 F. 772, 775 (9th Cir.
1919) (embezzlement).
"I In tax evasion cases the burden of going forward is on the defendant after the
prosecution establishes a prima facie case. Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 331, 335
(6th Cir. 1955). The burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon the
prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. McKnight v. United States, 115
F. 972, 976 (6th Cir. 1902). Whether the presumption is created for procedural conveni-
ence, such as the presumption that the defendant is sane, or whether it is created
because there is a probability that where the basic fact is found the presumed fact also
exists, information from the defendant may still be helpful in rebutting the presump-
tion. See Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 360-61 (1950) stating that
the government does not have to prove negative averments which are fairly well estab-
lished by circumstances and which if untrue could be readily disproven by the produc-
tion of evidence within the defendant's control; McCurry v. United States, 281 F. 532
(9th Cir. 1922) (nonpayment of tax due on retail liquor business and non-registration
of a still).
its See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965) stating that the defendant has the burden of rebutting
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ment, '1 7 qualification for an exception to the statute,"' alibi
defenses, self defense,"' and sometimes even insanity. '
C. Quantitative Measurement of the Defendant's Qualities
The final question is when does the performance level of
the defendant become so reduced that delaying trial is neces-
sary to guarantee due process. While precedent defines the
points past which a defendant is considered to be conclusively
competent or incompetent, 2 ' in the vast majority of cases the
court, guided by the competency-to-stand-trial test identifying
the areas that must not be substantially impaired if the defen-
dant is to stand trial, has to decide whether the defendant is
competent. While it should eventually be possible to devise a
qualitative standard delineating tasks the defendant may be
called on to perform, probably the goals the competency-to-
stand-trial doctrine was designed to promote already provide
the best quantitative standard possible. In other words,
whether the defendant is so disabled that he cannot stand trial
depends on the answer to questions such as: Is the defendant's
disablement so great that it would no longer be fair to match
him in an adversary contest with his antagonist, the state?
Would his inept participation turn the administration of jus-
tice into an invective against an insensate person?
The competency-to-stand-trial doctrine does not attempt
to compensate for the inevitable disparities among defendants.
Therefore, it is not enough that the defendant's performance
the presumption of knowledge, since his lack of knowledge lies peculiarly within his
sphere.
"' See, e.g., Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied
385 U.S. 816 (1966).
"I See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (abortion
exception).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 166 F.2d 497, 503 (3rd Cir. 1948); De Groot
v. United States, 78 F.2d 244, 251 (9th Cir. 1935).
'0 If insanity is the defense, the burden of raising and sustaining the defense is
on the defendant. Swisher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 921 (W.D. Mo. 1965). Enough
evidence has been introduced to meet the burden when a psychiatrist states that the
defendant was insane or when the defendant has been adjudicated mentally incompe-
tent at an earlier time. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
overruled, 471 F.2d 981 (1972) (restating insanity test only); Hurt v. United States,
327 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1964).
"I If a defendant is found incapable of standing trial in federal court, it is conclu-
sive he is incompetent in state court. Thomas v. Morrow, 361 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1962).
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level is such that it is more laborious and difficult for him to
perform his functions than it would be for an average person. 12
His functioning level must be so low that to force him to stand
trial would violate the due process requirement that a defen-
dant receive a fair trial. If the level of performance expected
were that of the reasonable man or even the average man,
many defendants would, by definition, be incompetent.
D. Pro Se Competency
A defendant can be competent to stand trial but not be
qualified to represent himself. If the accused represents him-
self,"' the functions he must perform are more complex than
those he would perform if he were guided by an attorney. 12
Therefore, once the court finds that the defendant is competent
to stand trial, if the defendant then asks to represent himself,
the court must decide the separate question of whether the
defendant is able to do so. In order to represent himself, the
defendant must be able to conceive, develop, and implement
defense strategies rather than merely select from well-
explained alternatives. Pro se representation requires that the
"I See United States v. Horowitz, 360 F. Supp. 772, 778 (E.D. Pa. 1973) holding
that the fact that a defendant was so emotionally shaken that testifying was difficult
was not enough to render him incapable of testifying and so incompetent.
' See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) making the sixth amendment
right of self-representation applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment;
United States v. Duty, 447 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1971) in which counsel was not forced on
the defendant once the court determined he was cognizant of his legal rights and the
consequences of his decision.
"4 A defendant competent to stand trial is not automatically able to represent
himself. E.g., State v. Westbrook, 406 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1965), vacated and remanded,
384 U.S. 150 (1966) where the Court recognized that being able to stand trial with the
aid of counsel is not the same as being able to represent oneself; Massey v. Moore, 348
U.S. 105 (1954), holding that a person may be found competent yet lack the capacity
to represent himself; United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 388 F. Supp. 221,
226 (S.D. N.Y. 1975), affl'd, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 937
(1976), in which the court admitted the decision to represent oneself was "vaguely
higher than the standard for competency to stand trial"; Gregori v. United States, 243
F.2d 48, 54 (5th Cir. 1957) where the dissent mentions that a lower standard for mental
ability may be sufficient if the defendant is represented by counsel; Silten & Tullis,
Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28 HAST. L.J. 1053, 1065-72 (1977) stat-
ing that a higher level of competency is necessary to represent oneself. But see People
v. Reason, 334 N.E.2d 572, 37 N.Y.2d 351 (1975); Silving, The Criminal Law of Mental
Incapacity, 53 J. Canm. L. 129, 140-41 (1962) in which he suggests that the test for
competency to stand trial might be whether the defendant can represent himself.
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defendant have greater initiative, imagination, and verbal abil-
ity than would be necessary if he were represented by counsel.
It has been argued that waiver of the right to counsel requires
a higher functional level than the waiver of other constitutional
rights. 25 Since the decisional process is similar in determining
whether to waive any right, it is doubtful that the waiver of
counsel itself requires more ability than the waiver of any other
right. However, once the decision to waive counsel is made, the
burden of conducting one's own defense does demand a higher
functional level than merely assisting counsel in preparing a
defense.
CONCLUSION
It would be a reproach to justice if a guilty man . . . post-
poned his trial upon a feigned condition of mind, as to his
inability to aid in his defense. On the other hand . . . . it
would be likewise a reproach to justice in our institutions, if
a human being 'made in God's own image,' while suffering as
the old books put it 'under a visitation from God,' were com-
pelled to go to trial at a time when he is not sufficiently in
possession of his mental facilities to enable him to make a
rational and proper defense. The latter would be a more
grievous error than the former; since in the one case an indi-
vidual would go unwhipped of justice, while in the other the
great safeguards which the law adopts in the punishment of
crime and the upholding of justice would be rudely invaded
by the tribunal whose sacred duty it is to uphold the law in
all its integrity.' 6
Failure to use the proper test for competency to stand
trial,' lack of knowledge regarding how to apply the test, and
"n Comment, Criminal Procedure-Competence and Waiver of the Right to a Jury
Trial-State v. Decello, 1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 227, focusing on this state court case
interpreting Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) in which the defendant was
charged with the murder of his attorney during an argument over the adequacy of his
representation in an earlier civil case.
" United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 288 (5th Cir. 1906).
'2 See, e.g., United States v. MacLeod, 83 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1949) where
the court announced that "the law will not try an individual whose mental condition
is such that he cannot distinguish right from wrong or cannot rationally aid in his
defense." See also Rowe v. State, 199 A.2d 785 (Md. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 924
(1964), declaring the M'Naghten test applicable for competency; Commonwealth v.
Cox, 100 N.E.2d 14, 16 (Mass. 1951); Davidson v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W. 631 (Ky.
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use of the procedures for illegitimate purposes are probably the
major reasons why incorrect decisions regarding competency to
stand trial have been made. Almost all of the effort in the last
ten years has been directed toward the education of those who
apply the test as to what the proper test is128 and toward the
development of safeguards that lessen the 'attractiveness of
using the competency process for improper purposes. '29
Confusion over the nature of the test is easily reduced if
1916) holding that the instructions to the jury were proper even though they stated that
the accused could be acquitted of the rape of a female if he were found insane at the
time of the offense or at the time of trial.
12 For articles on the confusion between the different tests, see, e.g., Morris, The
Confusion of Confinement Syndrome Extended: The Treatment of Mentally Ill "Non-
Criminal Criminals" in New York, 18 BUFFALO L. Rav. 393, 412 n.153 (1969) (return
for trial delayed by erroneous requirement that defendant no longer be mentally ill
rather than that he merely be fit to stand trial); Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity
to Stand Trial, 21 U. Prrr. L. REV. 593 (1960) (identification of the competency to
stand trial standard employed in practice as to whether an accused is mentally ill and
in need of hospitalization); Vann & Morganroth, Psychiatrists and the Competence to
Stand Trial, 42 U. DEw. L.J. 75, 84 (1964) (study of New York psychiatrists' misunder-
standings of the standard).
129 To make competency procedures less attractive as a means of circumventing
the death penalty, the vagaries of jurors, the prevailing standard for criminal non-
responsibility when it is believed too harsh, and the need to prove guilt, it is necessary
to persuade social palliators misclassifying the defendant that confinement in an insti-
tution for the mentally insane rather than prison may not be in the best interest of
the defendant and to devise and adopt procedures that make the use of competency
procedures as a means of preventive detention more difficult and less effective. If fuller
hearings are required before commitment, the maximum duration of the commitment
is limited, and periodic review of progress is required, it is more difficult to dispose of
persons labeled incompetent and forget about them. For articles on the misuse of the
competency procedures and ways suggested to safeguard against these misuses, see,
e.g., J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN, & A.M. DERSHOWrrz, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW
701-02 (1967); Arens, Due Process and the Rights of the Mentally Ill: The Strange Case
of Frederick Lynch, 13 CATH. U. L. REV. 3 (1964); Fried, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HARV.
L.REv. 1319-20 (1963); Halleck, The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia-A
Legal Lorelei, 49 GEO. L.J. 294, 319'(1960); Hess & Thomas, supra note 44, at 713-20;
Lewin, Disposition of the Irresponsible: Protection Following Commitment, 66 MICH.
L. REv. 721, 725 (1968); Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty, and the Law, 13
KAN. L. Rav. 59, 70 (1964); Smith, From Insanity to Incompetency: Fitness to Stand
Trial, 51 L.A.B.J. 340 (1976); Vann & Morganroth, The Psychiatrist as Judge: A
Second Look at the Competence to Stand Trial, 43 U. DEW. L.J. 1, 3 (1965); Note,
Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13 ARIz. L. Rav. 160, 161-62 (1971)(prosecutors and
defense attorneys admitted using the competency procedures as a dilatory tactic, as a
means of avoiding prolonged trials involving the insanity defense, and as a pre-trial
discovery device of the defendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged crime);
Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 110
U. PA. L. Rav. 78, 89-92 (1961) (median stay for pre-trial commitment in Pennsylvania
was 15 1/2 years compared to five months in New Jersey).
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the court articulates the proper test 3 ' and the legislature re-
places semantically similar terms-insanity at the time of the
act, insanity at the time of trial, and insanity requiring invol-
untary commitment-with more distinctive terms, such as in-
sanity, incompetency, and civil commitability respectively.
Application of the correct test avoids the over-inclusiveness
that results from reliance on the inappropriate criterion of
mental illness and the underinclusiveness that results from use
of the stricter test for criminal responsibility.
Procedures designed to insure that the competency doc-
trine is restricted to its true purposes also tend to reduce over-
inclusiveness. The less frequently the procedures are used as a
means of preventive detention, to get undesirables off the
streets without trial or to mitigate punishment, the fewer com-
petents likely to be classified as incompetent.
Adoption of the function-paradigm scheme proposed in
this Note should also reduce misclassifications. Courts imple-
menting this scheme should receive more relevant and com-
plete information upon which to base their decisions, and
courts should be better able to perform their analytical and
evaluative functions.
To facilitate the identification of a set of functions the
defendant must be able to perform in order to satisfy due pro-
cess, a preliminary investigation of eighteen potential func-
tions is made in section III of this Note. In section IV of this
Note a four-parameter paradigm is suggested as one format
that could be used to encourage a more organized analysis and
presentation of information on the effect of the defendant's
disability on his capacity to perform his functions.
The more that commentators, courts, and legislatures suc-
"3 In Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 729-30 (D.C. Cir. 1957), overruled, 471
F.2d 969, 997 (1972), (recast instruction for commitment after finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity) the court distinguishes the different tests for sanity:
The test for criminal responsibility focuses on whether the accused was in
such a mental condition at the time of the criminal act that he should not
be held responsible for his act, a question the jury should answer unless there
is no real conflict in the evidence. The test for fitness to stand trial focuses
on whether the accused is mentally able at the time of his trial to participate
effectively in his defense, a question solely for the judge. The test for commit-
ability focuses on whether the accused is sane at the time of his release from
incompetency confinement, since, if he is not, there may be reason to initiate
civil commitment proceedings.
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ceed in implementing the following objectives, the more vital
and accepted the competency-to-stand-trial doctrine will be-
come. First, a set of functions should be developed, defining the
kinds of activities a defendant might be expected to perform
to satisfy the test for competency to stand trial. Second, each
function should be analyzed to identify the attitudes, knowl-
edge, skills, and capabilities a person needs to perform each
function. Finally, statutory and decisional tests.should be re-
vised to reflect the expanded interpretation of the competency
test set forth in Dusky, and limiting words should be removed,
so that all similarly disabled defendants will be treated simi-
larly, regardless of the source of the dysfunction.
Claudine Walker Ausness
